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REFLECTIONS ON ARIZONA'S JUDICIAL

SELECTION PROCESS
Sandra Day O'Connor* & RonNell Andersen Jones**

Using Arizona as a case study, this Essay examines the history of changes in state
judicial-selectionrationales,methods, andpractices.It outlines Arizona's journey
from contested elections to a hybrid merit-selection system featuring appointments
and retention elections, and compares this experience to that of states that have
continued with a pure election system. The Essay explores the purported tension
between judicial accountability and judicial independence and argues that
Arizona's experience demonstrates both the falsity of that dichotomy and the
superiority of a hybrid merit-selection system in simultaneously promoting
accountability,independence, competency, andfairness.
INTRODUCTION
This 50th Anniversary Issue of the Arizona Law Review presents a
wonderful opportunity to look back at some remarkable legal developments of the
latter half of the twentieth century and the issues that have impacted the work of
the judicial branch during that time. One important development is a shift in the
issues surrounding the judicial selection process. This trend is particularly notable
at the state level because selection processes in the states are easier to change,
interest has historically been much lower, and more litigation takes place at the
state level than in the federal judicial system.' Judicial selection methods and the
practices surrounding them have a great impact on the accountability and
independence of judges, as well as on the public perceptions of the judiciary.
This Essay will discuss the history of changes in state judicial selection
rationales, methods, and practices, using Arizona as a case study. We will discuss
the historical context of Arizona's original contested elections, the rationale for
changing Arizona's judicial selection system in 1974 from elections to "merit
*
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selection," and the changes made in Arizona after the adoption of merit selection.
We will compare the experience in Arizona in the 1970s with the experience of
states that have continued to use a pure election system to see how changing
political realities affect considerations about judicial selection.
The basic controversy in judicial selection methods has been between
election and appointment processes, with tensions between demands for judicial
accountability and judicial independence. We will ultimately argue that Arizona's
experience, and the experience of other states since, show that a state is hardpressed to achieve the right kinds of independence and accountability under a pure
election system, or under a system in which the governor or the legislature has an
unfettered ability to unilaterally appoint judges. We further conclude that judges
are best able to perform their constitutionally prescribed role in a hybrid meritbased system like Arizona now has, featuring both appointment and retention
election.

I. THE RISE OF ELECTIONS FOR STATE JUDGES
Judicial elections were rare in the United States at the beginning of its
history. Of the original thirteen states, five states selected their judges with
gubernatorial appointment and legislative confirmation, and eight states selected
their judges with legislative appointment. 2 Reformers were concerned with those
states that gave the legislature unfettered control over the appointment-and
sometimes reappointment--of judges. The concern was that this control would
make the judiciary overly responsive to political pressure from the legislature.
Relations between the judiciary and the legislature were contentious in many of
these states. 3 As a result, the framers of the U.S. Constitution required that federal
judges be appointed by the President, approved by the Senate, and given lifetime
tenure. The founding fathers believed that this was the best way to ensure that
judges would be insulated from political pressure.
Georgia was the first state to implement judicial elections, amending its
constitution in 1812. As Jacksonian democratic reform escalated in the 1820s and
1830s, pressure mounted in other states for the election of judges. The rationale for
elections during this populist period was that elected judges would be more
accountable to the public than appointed judges. The rationale for judicial election
changed, however, when Jacksonian populism fizzled. Calls for judicial elections
continued in the mid-nineteenth Century based on the theory that "elected judges
who derived their authority from the people would be more independent-minded
than hand-picked friends of governors or jurists subject to the beck and call of the

2.
John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 ARIZ.
837, 840 (1990).

ST. L.J.

3.
Charles G. Geyh, An Overview of State JudicialSelection Systems and Their
Relationship to JudicialIndependence, in SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR PROJECT ON THE STATE
OF THE JUDICIARY, BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 2007 CONFERENCE: THE DEBATE OVER
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND STATE COURT JUDICIAL SELECTION, 7 (Georgetown Law, 2007).

20081 ARIZONA'S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS

17

legislature.",4 Election-favoring reformers largely succeeded and "[b]y the time of
the Civil War, the great majority of States elected their judges."5
Before statehood, Arizona stood firmly on the side of judicial elections.6
Arizona elected its judges in contested elections and allowed for judicial recall by
popular vote. President Taft vetoed a congressional resolution making Arizona a
state in 1912 because of Arizona's recall provision. President Taft said: "This
provision is so pernicious in effect, so destructive of the independence of the7
judiciary, that it is likely to subject the rights of individuals to possible tyranny."
Arizona responded to President Taft's criticism by abolishing judicial recall. After
acquiring statehood, Arizona promptly reinstated recall elections.
Importantly, however, the Governor appointed interim judges to fill
vacancies created between elections. In practice most judges were appointed in this
manner before they were elected,8 which would become one of the central
arguments for merit selection.

II. ELECTION IN PRACTICE AND THE RISE OF MERIT SELECTION
A new process for selecting judges, known as "merit selection," was first
developed in the early 1900s.9 Under a typical merit selection plan, an independent
commission of citizens recommends several candidates who would be suitable for
the position. From this pool, the Governor appoints a judge. After some period of
time, a retention election is held in which the voters get an up-or-down vote as to
whether the judge should stay on the bench. The rationale for the plan was twofold: first, reformers were concerned that elected judges did not undergo
sufficiently rigorous scrutiny regarding their legal competence; second, they were
concerned that election systems gave party bosses too much power over the
process, decreasing judges' independence and accountability to the law. The
second concern was driven by states like New York, for example, where the
Democratic Tammany Hall organization was "able to hand-pick judicial
judges and replacing them with
candidates, which resulted in ousting competent
'
incompetent but politically-responsive judges."'
In Arizona it was largely the first concern that fueled the argument for
merit selection: the election system was not doing a good enough job at ensuring
the selection of competent and qualified judges.
First, Arizona reformers were worried that voters did not have enough
knowledge about judicial candidates to select competent judges. There was little
voter interest in judicial elections and not much public information about the
candidates. The reality in Arizona was that judges campaigned only minimally,
4.
Id.
5.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785 (2002).
6.
Roll, supra note 2, at 844.
7.
Id.
8.
Mark I. Harrison et. al, On the Validity and Vitality of Arizona's Judicial
Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 239, 240
(2007).
9.
Roll, supra note 2, at 842-43.
10.
Id.
at 841.
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given their lack of resources and perhaps political skill and interest. Thus most
voters had little chance to get to know the candidates. Observers of Arizona's
judicial elections noted that "most voters are unaware of the candidates, the issues,
or even the race."'" A poll performed a month before the 1972 election showed
that sixty-five percent of Arizona voters were undecided about the state supreme
court races. 12 By comparison, just thirteen percent were undecided about the
presidential race and between twelve and twenty-five percent were undecided
about U.S. House races. Many of these under-informed and undecided voters
simply did not vote for a judicial candidate. In 1972, only eighty percent of those
who voted cast a ballot in the contested state supreme court races (the most high
profile of the judicial races) while ninety percent voted for 13State Tax
Commissioner and eighty-seven percent voted for State Mine Inspector.
When they did vote, it was common for voters to be influenced by factors
such as a familiar name. In an election for superior court judge, a little-known
practitioner defeated a sitting Maricopa County judge, most likely because the
challenger's name was the same as the well-known county director of elections,
who had been mentioned often in the media in the days leading up to the
election. 14 The state bar association survey, which is the main source of
information about how the judge was regarded by knowledgeable citizens, heavily
favored the losing incumbent. The apparent problem was not lost on reformers.
The President-elect of the State Bar of Arizona "contended that judges were
5
elected based upon good looks and their ability to raise money from attorneys."'
Second, reformers worried that judges who were appointed before they
were elected were not subject to any official screening process. The Arizona
system allowed immediate interim appointment by the governor upon a judge's
retirement until the next general election was held. While some governors used
commissions to review the qualifications of candidates, there was no official
process for ensuring an appointee's competence, and no input from the political
party that did not hold the governorship. When judges were appointed, they often
stayed in office because many of the subsequent elections were uncontested. In
fact, less than thirty percent of the general elections for judges were contested from
1958 to 1972.16 When elections were contested, the incumbents had a major
advantage in that they had the title of "judge" and uninterested voters were more
likely to know their names. Thus, from 1958 to 1972, the incumbent candidate was
defeated in only ten out of 215 judicial elections. 17 One proponent of merit
selection in the Arizona House of Representatives argued that because more than
seventy-five percent of judges in Arizona were "appointed at the whim of the

11.
Stephen E. Lee, Judicial Selection and Tenure in Arizona, 1973 L. & Soc.
ORD. 51, 55 (1973).
12.
Id.at 59.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 62.
Roll, supranote 2, at 850.
Lee, supranote 11, at 56.
Id. at 57.
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Governor" the
state needed a commission to help ensure competence and
18
impartiality.
Finally, it was argued that high-caliber candidates in Arizona were
disinclined to participate in political campaigns because of the insecurity of the
position of judge, especially given the disconnect between job performance and reelection. It was also argued that such candidates would not want to campaign for
the bench because they would "view campaigning as undignified and... because
there is no well-defined method for campaigning for the office."'19
The argument that electing judges made the judiciary too political was
made in Arizona, but largely as a theoretical matter or in reference to the
experiences of other states. The reality in Arizona was that political pressure was
not high given low voter interest in the affairs of the state judiciary and no
organized support from interest groups. There was some party support of
candidates, especially by the Republican Party, but nothing like the "judicial
appointment by party leaders" 20 that was going on in some other states. Some
worried that an election system had "the potential for unduly influencing judicial
decisions, '21 and there is some evidence that candidates tended to run on
"'platforms' supporting stronger sentences and stricter treatment of criminal
offenders. 22 But the politicization of judicial elections had not become a large
problem in Arizona.
Nevertheless, efforts in Arizona to implement a merit selection plan
23
began in 1959, when the Arizona State Bar Association proposed its adoption.
Momentum for implementing merit selection of judges grew through the 1960s
and early 1970s, as support for eliminating judicial elections increased throughout
the Arizona bar and among the public. In the 1970s, legislators began trying to
pass the plan.
In 1971, as a member of the Arizona Senate, one of the Authors of this
Essay worked with other legislators to co-sponsor a bill providing for merit
selection. 4 The bill proposed that commissions comprised of both attorneys and
laypersons screen judicial applicants. The names of at least three nominees,
selected "on the basis of merit alone without regard to political affiliation," would
then be forwarded to the governor. No more than two of the nominees could be
from the same party. 25 This seemed like a good way to ensure that the selection
process was between qualified candidates, and that neither the governor nor the

18.

Roll, supra note 2, at 849-50 (quoting ARiz.

19.

Lee, supra note 11, at 62.
Roll, supra note 2, at 842 (quoting

DAILY STAR,

Apr. 21, 1972, at

2B).
20.

AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS,

JAMES.

W.

HURST, THE GROWTH OF

132 (1950) (discussing political machines in Chicago)).

21.
Lee, supra note 11, at 63.
22.
Id.at 55.
23.
Roll, supra note 2, at 847-48.
24.
S.Con. Res. 6, 30th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1971) (Sandra Day
O'Connor, co-sponsor).
Id.
25.

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50:15

voters had unfettered power to select politically responsive judges. The bill did not
make it out of committee.
In 1973, these legislators tried again, introducing another bill that would
have established merit selection of judges.2 6 This bill allowed small counties to
retain judicial elections and increased the ratio of lay members to attorneys on the
nominating commissions due to concerns about undue influence by the state bar.
This time the bill passed in both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate. In
the House, however, the bill died in the Judiciary Committee.
The next year, legislative efforts having failed, supporters of the merit
selection plan began the process to amend the Arizona Constitution by initiative. 7
The initiative closely followed the provisions of the 1973 bill. Opponents, as
before, criticized the system for removing selection from the voters. Supporters
pointed out that, in practice, selection already was out of the voters' hands,
because governors appointed most judges to unexpired terms before they were
elected. 8 One supporter stated: "We now have a king maker who appoints judges.
[The Governor] appoints them without the advice of anyone. 29 Merit selection, on
the other hand, used a majority layperson commission to inform the Governor's
selection and prescribed periodic retention elections that would allow the voters to
have a critical voice in deciding whether or not a judge, based on her record,
should stay on the bench. Merit selection was thus marketed to voters as more
democratic than the status quo. Ultimately, Arizona voters approved the initiative
in 1974, electing to amend the Arizona Constitution to implement merit selection
of judges.

III. MERIT SELECTION IN PRACTICE
The first judges appointed under the new merit selection plan were
acclaimed as excellent choices. 30 Chief Justice Duke Cameron of the Arizona
Supreme Court, two years after the plan was instituted, praised the new judges as
"hard working, younger, more professional" judges. 31 He noted that the new
process encouraged high-caliber candidates to seek the bench, when under an
election system many would not have campaigned. Judge Mary Schroeder, later
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was among
the very first judges appointed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Sandra Day
O'Connor, one of the Authors of this Essay, was appointed to the Arizona Court of
Appeals just after the plan began, where she served until she was confirmed as a
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

26.
S. Con. Res. 1001, 31st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1973) (Sandra Day
O'Connor, co-sponsor).
27.
Roll, supra note 2, at 853.
28.
Id. at 854; Harrison, supra note 8, at 240.
29.
Roll, supra note 2, at 854 (quoting ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Oct. 30, 1974, at 2A).
30.
James Duke Cameron, Merit Selection in Arizona-The First Two Years,
1976 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 425, 429.
31.
Roll, supra note 2, at 855 (quoting Susan Shultz, The Judges and the System,
ARIZ.B.J., Oct. 1978, at 26).
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Over time, critics charged that the merit selection system failed to ensure
accountability, pointing to the difficulty and rarity of removing an incumbent
judge through the process of review and retention elections. 32 In response, Arizona
voters ultimately passed a constitutional amendment in 1992, Proposition 109,
which implemented a comprehensive system for review of judges. Under this
system, a commission appointed by the Supreme Court of the State, and comprised
of lawyers, judges and other citizens, develops performance standards and
thresholds for judges and conducts performance reviews.
The main sources of information for the review process are anonymous
surveys. The surveys are distributed to all participants in the judicial process, from
litigants and attorneys to witnesses and courtroom administrative staff.33 After
collecting information through the surveys and public hearings, the commission
reviews judges and publishes its reports in preparation for the retention elections.
Proposition 109 also requires judges to go through a process of selfevaluation and meetings in which they use the results of the commission's findings
to identify and document areas requiring improvement. After this evaluation
process, judges work with the commission to implement a plan for improvement,
which is subsequently used to assess progress. Combined, the two functions of the
review process-informing voters of judicial evaluations for retention election
purposes and working with individual judges to help them identify areas of their
performance requiring improvement-create an effective means of ensuring
judicial accountability.
IV. THE NEW WORLD OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
In the states that have retained partisan judicial elections of judges, the
problems are different than those that Arizona addressed in the 1970s. Judicial
elections have become "nastier and noisier," 34 so the concern about judicial
independence now exceeds the concern about judicial accountability and
competence in those states with a pure election system, though both concerns are
still valid.
Some of the attributes that characterized judicial elections in Arizona
remain in the states that hold contested judicial elections. Voter interest in judicial
elections remains low, and judicial candidates are still far less known than
legislative and executive candidates. Judicial elections remain less likely to be
contested than other types of elections, and incumbents win election the vast

32.

John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical

Effects and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 657-58 (1998) ("The fact that no judges were
ousted in [the first retention election under Arizona's merit selection system in] 1976 was
deemed '[a] critical fault in the new system."' (quoting Susan Schultz, The Judges and the
System, ARIz. B.J., Oct. 1978, at 29)).

33.

Id.at 673.

34.
Roy A. Schotland & Bert Brandenberg, Justice in Jeopardy: The
EndangeredBalance between ImpartialCourts and JudicialElection Campaign, in SANDRA
DAY O'CONNOR PROJECT ON THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY, BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 2007
CONFERENCE: THE DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND STATE COURT JUDICIAL
SELECTION 29, 32 (Georgetown Law, 2007).
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majority of the time. Finally, many judges in election states still reach the bench by
appointment due to a vacancy, meaning that many "elected" judges are appointed
first. All of these factors raise concerns about whether the best-caliber judges are
being selected and whether they are being sufficiently evaluated.
The concern about judicial independence is much stronger, however, in
today's contested election states. There has recently been a sharp rise nationwide
in the percentage of judicial races that are contested. Of high-court incumbents,
only fifty-two percent faced contested elections from 1980 to 1996, while seventyone percent faced opponents from 1996 to 2007. 35 One reason for this is that wellorganized interest groups are now mobilized to help opposition candidates run
effective campaigns against incumbents.
These groups-from plaintiff's attorneys to corporations to cultural
warriors-have strong preferences about the outcome of certain types of cases and
have mobilized to finance judges who they hope will be sympathetic to their
causes. The result has been an arms race in funding, making it so that campaigning
for state judge can be as expensive as campaigning for U.S. Senate. The biggest
increase in funding so far came in 2000, in which state supreme court candidates
raised a record $45.6 million combined, a sixty-one percent increase over the year
before.36 It is not unusual for a candidate for judge in a contested race to raise well
over $1 million. In Illinois in 2006, the two candidates in a race for the Supreme
Court seat raised $9.3 million-more than was raised in 18 out of 34 Senate races
that year.37 In comparison, a campaign for a position on the Supreme Court of
Arizona in the 1970s was estimated as "at least $25,000 and . . . as much as
$100,000. ",38 Even after indexing for inflation, this is nowhere near the amount of
money poured into judicial campaigns in the 2000s.
Money is funneled into "informing" the voters about judicial candidates,
often in the form of television advertisements. In fact, all but two of the almost
twenty states with contested elections for the highest court have had network
television advertisements. These advertisements, it has been noted, are to judicial
selection what French Fries are to nutrition. 39 They are full of information, but
very little of it is helpful, and some of it is downright harmful: "Fewer than I in 3
ads in the 2004 Supreme Court races focused on the traditional themes of
qualifications, experience and integrity. Far more often, judicial campaign ads
misrepresent facts and scare voters. Complicated decisions
are reduced to slogans
'4 °
and fealty to the law is subordinated to soundbites.
One result of the "noise and nastiness" is that voters in states that elect
judges are more cynical about the courts, more likely to believe that judges are
legislating from the bench, and less likely to believe that judges are fair and

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Lee, supranote 11, at 55.
Schotland and Brandenberg, supra note 34, at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
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impartial. 41 This distrust likely has the perverse effect of making voters more
inclined to elect their judges rather than allowing for an appointment process. If
judges, like legislators, are perceived as making decisions based on policy
preferences, voters want to have a voice in what they decide.

V. THE ACCOUNTABILITY V. INDEPENDENCE MYTH
Judicial independence and judicial accountability are usually perceived as
diametrically opposed. Today, it is often said that if we care about judicial
independence we should favor appointment of judges and if we care about judicial
accountability we should favor judicial elections. Appointment, some say, ensures
that the judiciary is independent from the vagaries of public opinion. Elections,
others argue, ensure that judges, as government actors, are accountable to the
people they serve. But as we have shown above, problems of accountability and
independence can exist within the same system. The dichotomy between judicial
independence and judicial accountability is ultimately a false one, because it relies
on distorted portrayals of the judiciary's role.
To be sure, the judiciary must be accountable to the public. But its
accountability is on a macro rather than a micro level; the judiciary should not
respond to public opinion in its individual decisions. Rather, the founders called
for a judiciary that is accountable to the public for its constitutional role of
applying the law fairly and impartially. As long as the people believe in our threebranch system of government, judicial accountability means that judges must first
and foremost be held to their public promise to fulfill their unique role. Judicial
independence means that judges must resist both public bias and their own
inclinations to eschew the law to achieve a policy outcome. Thus, correctly
understood, accountability and independence are two sides of the same coin:
accountability ensures that judges perform their constitutional role, and judicial
independence protects judges from pressures that would pull them out of that role.
VI. LESSONS FROM THE ROAD TAKEN IN ARIZONA AND OTHER
STATES
Arizona's experience and current trends in states with contested judicial
elections demonstrate that a contested election process, especially if it is partisan,
cannot maximize accountability and independence. The experience of judicial
elections in Arizona shows that when voter interest in the judiciary is very low,
voters will not have the necessary tools to ensure that judges are fairly and
competently applying the law rather than acting according to their own whims or
policy preferences. Other states' recent experience with judicial elections shows
that when interest group pressure rises on particular issues, judges face political
pressure that could hinder their independence. This political pressure comes both
as a result of the need to attract interest group financing, and because of
considerations of political responses to their actions. Whenever a judge acts in a
41.
Annenberg Public Policy Center, Public Understanding of and Support for
the Courts: 2007 Annenberg Public Policy Center Judicial Survey Results,
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial
_Findings_ 10-17-2007.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
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state with contested elections, she is tempted to consider how that action could be
reduced to a soundbite in a television ad, which may have nothing to do with the
law's proper application in that case.
Ugly contested elections are increasing public perceptions ofjudicial bias.
This perception leads voters to want to elect judges who will at least be biased
toward the causes that they care about. The ugliness of campaigns will only
increase with greater public interest in judicial elections, as powerful issue-based
interest groups are unlikely to disband as long as they see the potential to elect
favorable judges. Strong grassroots organizing for fairness and impartiality alone
has not yet been achieved in election states, and it is unlikely that it will any time
soon.
Merit selection may not be a perfect solution, but it is clearly better than
the pure election system. Almost any system designed to select individuals or
evaluate human performance-particularly when that performance involves the
sometimes politically charged task of doing justice-will have its flaws, and will
give rise to criticisms from those who disagree with its results in isolated instances.
Also, there is the possibility, even in a merit selection process, that a nominating
commission will become politicized, that a governor will not act in good faith to
select the best possible candidate, or that a retention election will be infected with
issue-based politics. But Arizona's sharing of responsibility between a commission
for appointment, a commission for evaluation, the governor of the state, and the
people in retention elections provides the kinds of checks and balances that are
critical to our democracy. Also, Arizona has worked hard to ensure a cross-section
of participants in the process by carefully choosing an independent commissionselection process that ensures bipartisanship and diversity, with requirements that
more than half of commission-members are non-lawyers.
In practice, the Arizona experience shows us that merit selection can
work to promote both accountability and independence, and to select highly
qualified, competent judges who will uphold the judicial promise to be fair and
impartial arbiters of the law. Like democracy itself, merit selection relies on a
wide-angle view of our nation's goals for its people and produces a systemic
superiority that safeguards our most precious baseline values. And like democracy
itself, merit selection of judges may have its faults, but it is better than any other
method our states have tried.

